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INTRODUCTION
The study of administrations -"black boxes" of political systems- can be
approached from different perspectives, and numerous research methods can be
used to analyze them. For this paper, as will be seen shortly, I have chosen to
focus on the individuals who manage the Administration, and have relied on
personal interviews as the basis of my working method. This paper is, therefore, a
study of political elites and, more specifically, of the political elites found in the
Catalan Administration.
Studies on political elites are still scarce and the subject still needs to be
properly developed. Such deficiencies are even more serious in countries, like
Spain, lacking a long democratic tradition. It could even be said that the subject of
political elites is perhaps the least studied aspect of the Spanish political system,
and, as we know, it is a subject that can yield much relevant information on how
political systems really work. There are a number of papers on political party’s
elites, parliamentary elites, and local elites. In contrast, there are very few papers
on political elites in the Administration. With my research, of which this paper is
only a small part, I intend to make up for the imbalance in the field, while at the
same time approaching the study of the Administration from a new perspective.
This paper deals with political elites in the Catalan Administration. It is,
therefore, a paper on a subject that is limited both geographically and in terms of
the human component it analyzes. As far as its geographical limits are concerned,
it is a paper on the Administration of one of the most important autonomous
communities in Spain. Catalonia has a population of 6 million; a general budget of
over one and a half billion pesetas, one of the largest budgets of all Spanish
autonomous communities; and its civil service employs about 35,000 people.
Since the 1980 Catalan autonomous elections, the first elections after
democracy was restored at the end of the Franco regime, Catalonia has been
governed by a party coalition called Convergència i Unió (CiU). Since then, this
coalition has won all autonomous elections by absolute majority (see Table 1).
Thus, if we were to apply Sartori’s typology1, we would describe the Catalan party
system as a "predominant party system".
CiU is a coalition of two parties: Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya
(CDC) and Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC). The ideology of the former can
be labeled as Catalan nationalist, while the latter is Christian democrat. The
undisputed leader of the coalition is Jordi Pujol, the President of the Catalan
Government since 1980, and also the president of CDC, the largest party in the
coalition.
As far as the limited group of individuals it studies, this paper focuses on the
so-called "high officials" of the Catalan Administration, namely, its Secretaries
General and General Directors. The two basic laws that have to be mentioned
concerning the regulations for high officials of the Catalan Administration are: Law
3/1982 of March 23, on the Parliament, on the President and on the Executive
Council of the Generalitat; and especially Law 13/1989 of December 14,
concerning the organization, the procedure and the juridical regime of the
Administration of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Both laws were approved by the
Catalan Parliament.
If we look at the internal structure of each one of the fourteen departments2
which together compose the Catalan Administration (Table 2), we will realize that
what is being studied are politically designated positions (the political elites of the
Administration), whose candidates enjoy the political confidence of those who
propose them (the consellers or ministers), and of those who actually appoint them
(the Executive Council). These positions can be discretionarily filled by individuals
who do not need to be members of the public service (no specific knowledge or
special condition is therefore required). Other positions, however, are distinctly set
apart, such as Catalan Government positions (consellers-governmental elites), or
freely assigned positions, which unlike politically assigned positions, have to be
occupied by members of the public service (public service elites).
The ministers, elected by the President of the Generalitat, are at the head of
each administrative Department and constitute, with the President, the Catalan
government. The ministers are, therefore, governmental elites. Under them, we
find the Secretaries-General (there is one per department), who are the second
authority of the department and who carry out technical and political functions
(article 13 of Law 13/1989). These are, for instance, representing the Department
in the name of the minister, communicating with other Administrations and entities
related to them, coordination of the actions of the Department in relation to the
transfer of functions and services, coordination of the programs and actions of the
head office as well as of the bodies dependent on the Department, etc. As a result,
the technical functions have a decisive influence on political aspects (for instance,
functions related to the budget or to the staff of the Department). Under them, there
are the General Directors. There may be more than one per d partment (as a rule,
there are between four and eight) and their functions (article 14 of Law 13/1989)
never go beyond the boundaries of the head office (affairs of the Department which
are their duty, affairs related to their position, subjects proper to the head office,
services dependent on them), and all have a sectorial background.
Under the General Directors, there may be Deputy General Directors, which
are posts that are freely designated, that is to say, that require having a precise
category in the civil servant hierarchy, but which are selected rather than
contested. Finally, under such posts, there may be heads of services, heads of
sections, and heads of department sectors, who are civil servants and, therefore,
get to these posts through the usual procedure in the public administration.
There is also another, time-related, limitation inherent in the scope of this
paper. In it, none of the people who have occupied high positions (Secretaries
General and General Directors) in the Catalan Administration since 1980 have
been studied. It is not a study of recent history of the Catalan Administration (a
retrospective study), but rather focuses on high officials who completed the third
legislature and began the fourth one, that is to say, those who were holding a
position in the first quarter of 1992. At that time, there were a total of sixty-six
General Directors and fifteen Secretaries General (the Department of the
Presidency is the only one with two Secretaries General), which constituted the
field of study, that is to say, a total of eighty-one high officials. This figure, however,
amounts to 50% of the total number of people who have been Secretaries General
or General Directors from 1980 until 1994, since a high percentage of high officials
included in this category have been in office for a number of years, some of them
until the present. This is a trait that points to a certain stability in this kind of
positions.
I am especially interested in finding out about the recruitment process of the
political elites in the Catalan Administration; knowing what the prevailing criteria for
appointing high officials in the Catalan Administration are and, more specifically,
whether technical or political criteria determine the final decision; and, from there,
establishing the degree of politicization found in the Administration. In order to
find out about all these aspects, I have resorted to one of the most frequently used
methods when studying political elites in depth: personal interviews based on a
questionnaire. The interviews, which I myself carried out, included a questionnaire
composed of more than eighty questions. For the purposes of this paper, however,
I will only comment on aspects related to the recruitment of high officials.
Out of a total of eighty-one high officials, I interviewed seventy-seven of
them; that is to say, 95%. This percentage, which I qualify as an absolute success,
makes the analysis of the answers more reliable and a solid base to my
conclusions, since I am not working with a sample, but with almost all the census.
2. FORMAL POLITICIZATION
Public administrations, like any other human organization, are composed of
groups of individuals structured in the form of a pyramid: those who are on top -at
the vertex of the pyramidal structure- theoretically wielding more power, and being
more influential, than those who are below them in rank. This is something that can
be found in almost any country in the world. There is a larger measure of
heterogeneity, however, in the configuration of administrative structures, in
interpersonal relations (inside a department, between departments, between
institutions, and with the social totality whom they manage), in decision making, in
the regulation of institutional management, in the sheer magnitude, in the
terminology used, etc., but also in the recruitment of high officials. As far as the
latter point is concerned, administrations can be divided up in two distinct groups:
those that are more politicized and those that are less politicized. Although different
criteria can be applied to gauge the degree of formal politicization of a given
administration, we can conclude that administrations with a longer public service
career or, in other words, with fewer politically appointed positions (as well as
fewer freely appointed positions) are less formally politicized than other
administrations with a shorter public service career, or with more politically
assigned positions (as well as more freely assigned positions). In order to find out
what system prevails in a given administration, one must simply read the current
norms regulating the recruitment of candidates for all its different offices. These
norms establish what positions are to be filled by public service members that are
to be freely assigned, and which can be politically assigned3. In a dition to that, the
exact number of positions falling into each one of these categories needs to be
established. Once this information is obtained, we are equipped to determine the
degree of ormal politicization4.
The Catalan Administration, unlike others based on the "Whitehall model"5,
is a formally politicized administration: there are many positions that are politically
appointed within its pyramidal administrative structure. Moreover, it could also be
argued that as the Administration has gradually evolved, it has become more
politicized, since the number of high-ranking officials has increased. Thus, in 1981,
just one year after the first autonomous elections, there were only fifty high
positions6 to be filled, that is, twenty-eight less than those contemplated in this
paper.
But in order to establish with higher precision the level of formal politicization
prevalent in the Catalan Administration, it is necessary to undertake a comparative
analysis with the administrations of other Spanish autonomous communities. Table
3 shows a list of politically appointed positions in Spanish autonomous
communities, while Table 4 is a listing by autonomous communities of the total
number of these positions7.
The Basque Country, Catalonia, and Andalusia are the autonomous
communities with the largest numbers of high positions. The remaining
communities have much lower numbers of high positions, especially Aragon and
Navarre, which feature the smallest amounts. We might also add that from the
point of view of recruitment regulations, the Aragonese Administration is the one
with the most "professionalized" organizational structure, or the least politicized
one. Lastly, we might also conclude that when calculating the total number of
political positions in the administrations of the various autonomous communities,
neither the number of administrative areas the community is responsible for
managing, nor the total number of public service employees, are determining
factors (as can be inferred from the cases of Navarre and Valencia, both of which
are communities with low levels of political positions and high levels of
administrative responsibility)8.
3. MATERIAL POLITICIZATION
In order to find out the exact degree of politicization present in a given
Administration, however, one must go beyond the purely normative and
quantitative perspective: it becomes necessary to establish its degree of material
politicization, that is to say, to determine what are the criteria used to recruit
candidates for politically appointed positions. In order to obtain this kind of
information, it is necessary to carry out an individualized, detailed analysis of all
individuals holding office, and then study their cursus honorum.
This information is crucial for an understanding of the phenomenon of
politicization in the Catalan Administration. We must determine whether, in addition
to a formally -structurally- politicized administration, we can also talk about the
existence of a materially politicized Administration in Catalonia, that is to say, an
Administration whose real criteria, when appointing candidates for positions that
are assigned discretionarily, are mainly political. Material politicization is,
undoubtedly, the kind of politicization that best defines the prevailing degree of
politicization in a given Administration.
3.1. Political Affiliation
The first -and perhaps the main- factor to be taken into account is the
political affiliation of those in high office. An administration in which political
positions are occupied by individuals who belong to the governing party (or
parties), can be regarded as being more materially politicized than another
administration where this is not the case.
In Catalonia, two out of three high positions are assigned to members of the
governing coalition parties. Of these, a little over 70% belong to CDC, and almost
30% to UDC. Thus, in terms of political affiliation, high positions in the Catalan
Administration are distributed as is shown in Table 5.
These percentages confirm our claim that the Catalan Administration is not
only formally politicized, as we just saw, but also materially politicized9 (or, as other
specialists would phrase it10, not very "professionalized"), It is in such a way that
one could even argue that there is a certain tendency towards a "spoils system"11,
as well as a strong sense of loyalty and of political kinship among its high
officials12. Although we do not have exact evidence regarding the evolution of
political affiliations among high officials, Alfonso de Alfonso Bozzo calculated that
political affiliation among Secretaries General and General Directors in the Catalan
Administration in 1981 was not at all common, "about 18%"13. We can infer from
this, that the degree of material politicization in the Catalan Administration over the
past ten years has undergone a very sharp increase, especially if we consider that
"the longer the time the same party remains in power, the less necessary it
becomes to resort to ‘political’ or ‘presidential appointees’"14. Administrations with
no tradition of public service, like the Catalan Administration, and therefore, where
public service bodies have no consolidated influence (in contrast with what, to
some extent, occurs in the Spanish central Administration15, and especially in the
French one)16, formal politicization also becomes material politicization17, that is to
say, politically appointed positions are filled mostly according to political criteria18.
As a result of this, the chances for a career in the public service are severely
reduced, a situation that may discourage those who are already pursuing it
(especially if they are young, which is what happens in the Catalan Administration),
or those who have yet to begin their careers. In Catalonia, other factors are
brought into play which, in my opinion, also tend to add to the already high degree
of material politicization in the Administration. On the one hand, the secondary role
and minor influence of the Catalan Parliament, and, on the other, the existence of a
coalition government. The presence for many years of an ample majority both in
Parliament and government -a government that enjoys the support of an absolute
majority in Parliament- has been undermining the protagonism of Parliament and
strengthening the role of the Administration. As a result, political initiative has been
almost entirely placed in the hands of the Administration, and appointees for
political positions in the Administration are chosen predominantly on the basis of
political criteria. In this way, a faithful implementation of the governing coalition’s
political program is ensured. It is known that coalition governments, like the one
governing Catalonia since 1980, usually bring forth an artificial growth of the
administrative structure -of that part of the structure where political positions are
concentrated-. This is precisely as a consequence of the desire on the part of
coalition members to cover a maximum number of politically assigned positions
and, thus, to reach as many areas of political influence as possible by placing in
them individuals connected to the party. The lack of consolidated public service
bodies, the minor political role of the Parliament and the existence of a coalition
government are the three basic factors that can help explain the high degree of
material politicization present in the Catalan Administration. In spite of that, the fact
that one third of high officials are people who are not involved in party politics can
also indicate a certain introduction of specialists and/or technicians (individuals
who have been recruited on the basis of their specialized training) to fill positions of
political management in the Administration.
As far as the division between Secretaries General and General Directors is
concerned, we have been able to observe that the former are proportionally more
linked to political parties (86%) than the latter are (60%)19. Secretaries General
tend to be individuals who enjoy greater political trust from the ministers than
General Directors do. Whenever a minister is replaced, its Secretary General is
also replaced, which is not the case with General Directors20, who, as we have
already mentioned, have clearly delimited sectorial functions which tend to require
a more specialized profile from the person responsible for their implementation.
The fact that there is greater political trust placed on Secretaries General can also
be the reason why they are proportionally more involved with political parties than
General Directors, since political parties are the main fora for the establishment of
political loyalties and interpersonal alliances.
3.2. Professional Itinerary
As far as the professional itinerary of political officials in the Administration is
concerned, we could also describe a number of different tendencies. An
administration in which politically assigned officials have a background in the
private sector or in elective public positions tends to be more politicized than an
administration in which public positions are given to members of the public service.
What is the situation in Catalonia? A little more than half of all high officials
(52%), had worked in the public sector before entering the Catalan Administration,
and the remaining 48% in the private one. Neither sector can be considered as the
main source for the provision of high officials, but the percentage of those coming
in from the private sector can be regarded as considerably high. Thus, if we take
into account figures from the early eighties, with 54% of high administration officials
coming from the public sector and 26% from the private one21, we can argue that
the degree of "privatization" of professional sources of provision of high officials,
that even then was regarded as high, has undergone an even greater increase in
the last ten years. In the case of administrations in other countries, the transfer
from the private sector to public management rarely takes place. Thus, in the
French Administration, the source of provision to fill managerial positions -which,
theoretically, are freely appointed positions, although "in practice, the minister’s
choice of a Director is limited by or accommodated to the rivalries between the
various corps"-22, is invariably the public sector. This is a result, among other
reasons, of the difference in salary and the limited knowledge of "outsiders" (those
coming in from the private sector) of the norms and mechanisms of the
Administration23. In the United States, although there is also a predominance of
officials coming from the public sector, the difference in salaries is not as
pronounced as in France24.
As for the Catalan Administration, such an important presence of the private
sector, as one of the main sources of provision of high officials, was already
explained in the early eighties. The reasons were on the one hand, "the political
qualification of the governing coalition, CiU, an alliance of two nationalist,
conservative parties with strong, even personal, ties in the local banking sector and
local private industries;" and on the other, by "the traditional ‘reluctance’ of the
Catalan middle classes and Catalan nationalists to work for the public sector and
the Administration"25. Such explanations can lead us to regard the considerable
percentage of high officials coming in from the private sector as additional
evidence of the material politicization of the Catalan Administration. Moreover, if
we pay close attention to the political affiliation of high officials, we will see that
non-affiliated high officials come mainly from the public sector (58%), while those
connected with a given political party come primarily from the private sector (52%).
One out of five high officials has occupied or still occupies an elective public
position (more specifically, 13% have held them, and 7% still held them at the
moment when the interviews were being carried out). Such percentages are not
completely irrelevant, if we bear in mind the short life of Spanish democratic
institutions. Of course, there is a big difference between high officials who are
affiliated to the governing coalition parties and those who are not. Thus, while
almost 30% of affiliated members have occupied or still occupy an elective public
position (without marked differences between those affiliated to CDC and members
of UDC), among the non-affiliated, however, we have only found one case.
Most high officials in the Catalan Administration (almost 60%) are not
members of the public service. As we have already shown, candidates for the
positions of Secretary General or Director General do not need to be members of
the public service (in contrast to what happens, for instance, in similar positions of
the British Administration where, consequently, "a professional sociology of the
Permanent Secretaries would not make much sense (...), since probably all of
them have a professional background in the Administration")26, n r is there, as we
already pointed out, any pressure on those in charge of appointing candidates to
choose members of the public service (as is the case of those administrations with
a longer tradition of public service and in which public service bodies, such as, for
instance, public administration high officials, diplomats, finance inspectors, and
trade technicians in the Spanish Administration, play a more influential role27; and,
especially, the grand corps of the French Administration)28. For these reasons, in
the case of the Catalan Administration, it is not possible to speak of a process of
"colonization of the political class"29 by those working in the public service, as
occurs, for instance, in the French Administration. Nevertheless, the fact that 40%
of those occupying high positions are members of the public service could be
interpreted as a mild "colonization" process of political management positions on
the part of public service elites. However, such a claim would have to be qualified,
since more than 80% of high officials who are also in the public service are
affiliated to one of the two governing parties in Catalonia and, thus, what really
takes place, in words of Mariano Baena, is a "preferential assignation that allows
those affiliated to the governing party to occupy positions according to their
experience and knowledge in managing a government. When this process takes
place, it is not really the Administration that colonizes the political class, since the
actual protagonists are the political parties themselves"30.
As a result of all this, one may therefore conclude that professional
itineraries are a way of consolidating the high degree of material politicization
found among high officials of the Catalan Administration.
4. CONCLUSIONS
If we take into account the normative make-up of the structure of the
Catalan Administration, we will conclude that it is a form lly politicized structure,
and, if we compare the number of high officials in the various autonomous
communities in Spain, we will see how the Catalan Administration is one of the
most politicized. In relation to what I have been referring to as its m terial
politicization, although there are no exact figures available from the other
autonomous communities that would enable us to establish a formal comparison,
we can also say that, in the case of Catalonia, we are dealing with a clearly
politicized Administration. Two out of three high officials are affiliated to one of the
two parties that together form the governing coalition; almost half of them come
from the private sector; one out of five has held an elective public position; and
only about 40% are actually employed in the public service. Such percentages are
difficult to find in other European Administrations. Finally, the evolution of the
Catalan Administration has brought about a higher degree of formal and material
politicization. At the present moment, there are many more politically appointed
positions, many more officials that are affiliated to either one of the two governing
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of long-standing public service bodies in the Spanish Administration, bodies which, as Juan
Santamaría Pastor points out, have turned into "a common instrument for the creation of elites,
at least in relation to the higher levels of the public service," and "this function of the public
service as a selection mechanism is recurrently criticized by certain political groups"
(SANTAMARÍA, J.: op. cit., p. 11). On this point, see also, ALBA, C.: "The Organization of
Authoritarian Leadership: Franco’s Spain", in ROSE, R. and SULEIMAN, E. (eds.): Pre idents
and Prime Ministers. Washington, American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research,
1980, p. 276-281; ÁLVAREZ, J.: Burocracia y poder político en el régimen franquista. (El papel
de los cuerpos de funcionarios entre 1938 y 1975). Madrid, Instituto Nacional de
Administración Pública, 1984.
(28) Thus, as Rafael Jiménez Asensio points out in regard to politically assigned positions,
"theoretically, anyone meeting the general conditions for access into the public service is
eligible to carry out this kind of positions, and it is not required that he or she be employed in
the public service. Nonetheless, French administrative reality has imposed its own criteria. As
a general rule, almost all these positions are covered by public service employees who belong
to any of the large bodies in which the French State’s Administration is divided up. Thus, one
might even argue that there is a process of relative colonization (...) of certain areas within the
Administration (Departments, specific Directorates, etc.) by certain elite bodies which, in some
cases, go as far as imposing the name of the candidate to be appointed to a politically
assigned position". (JIMÉNEZ ASENSIO, R.: op. cit., p.80).
(29) BAENA, M.: "Quelques réflexions sur la relation entre hommes politiques et hauts
fonctionnaires", Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives, nº 1/1987, p. 128-135.
(30) BAENA, M.: op. cit., p. 130.
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